Atheism and Examples

The notion of atheism is often presented as a stark acceptance of the absence of divine presence, in direct opposition to what some call theism, a term often loosely thrown around to include any affirmation of the divine reality, often trying to make some attempt to demonstrate its existence. This view, however, fails to consider a broader group of nonbelievers who take the position of considering the question as ultimately unanswerable; such individuals are not necessarily atheists or theists, but rather those who consider the problem as ultimately unknowable; we call them agnostics. These three categories – believer, disbeliever, and agnostic – are not as neatly defined as one may first imagine, and so a certain dialogue needs to happen so that we might properly classify these positions. Therefore, we must begin to consider what exactly constitutes atheism, and what would justify such a stance. After all, it seems so simple to define, and yet the more we dig, the more difficult the matter becomes. To achieve this, we will begin with commonly held conceptions about the topic, before we proceed toward a more detailed examination and better arguments, looking at arguments both in favor and in opposition to the idea. This examination must consider that the central belief of three major world religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all share the same idea that there is only one God. It’s not just that they believe in a God, but that they have a shared conviction that this God is a celestial being, the absolute monarch of all that exists, having created the universe and all of its people, and demanding a life of obedience for that creation’s meaningful existence. Atheism, therefore, is not simply a denial of specific religious concepts; it’s a much wider rejection of a system, that has various forms, in rejecting not just the singular God of these religions, but a multitude of divine beings and systems of belief found around the world, including those found in African traditions such as Dinka and Nuer, not to mention the many Gods of Greece and Rome, or even the transcendent gods of Hinduism and Buddhism. Thus, it’s not merely a question of denying a particular God or set of religious ideas; it’s a position that holds that belief in any divine or spiritual entity or concept should not be considered as valid or as having any truth. However, to simply state that atheism is the rejection of all religious beliefs, based on a denial of a God or Gods, is an insufficient approach, because to truly understand the position, we need to unpack the word “rejection,” and analyze if this denial of a divine being is enough to properly categorize it.

Defining atheism as merely the opposite of theism is not only inadequate, but also misrepresents the complexity of each term, and so we must dig deeper into the nature of these terms. Indeed, many who are, for example, devout Christians, may not classify themselves as “theists” in the traditional sense. Consider, for example, a theologian such as Paul Tillich, who, while firmly within the Christian tradition, criticizes the idea of God as some supreme being, and argues that this is actually a form of idolatry, and so we see the beginnings of a problem of easy categorization. Tillich posits that the idea of God is not a ‘being’, but rather the very ground of being, and therefore the source of all meaning, demonstrating just how complicated even the seemingly clear concept of ‘God’ is. Now, while Tillich’s view might be unusual, or even obscure for some, his rejection of traditional theism while still maintaining a belief in some form of ‘God’ is not completely unique in modern theology. And it might be a little confusing for the plain believer, demonstrating that even within those who believe, definitions are not simple. Additionally, many theists do not seek to provide a logical argument to prove God’s existence and would not even entertain the idea. Indeed, many theists see this as a wrong and even harmful endeavor, feeling that the very act of trying to prove God rationally is ultimately impossible, if not undesirable, because it destroys faith, a key part of the experience. Indeed, if God’s existence were so obvious that it could be proved, accepting God would be a matter of rational certainty and not one of faith, which is in part accepting the inherent risks of accepting something without a solid proof. For them, true faith requires a level of uncertainty, a belief in a hidden God, or some mysterious ultimate reality, which they cannot see or prove, but are willing to accept as a matter of faith. This complex notion of faith, though not universally held even by believers, proves the point that defining atheism as the simple opposite of theism is not a correct assumption. Therefore, it is essential to understand that the act of denying a God may not necessarily be about denying his existence. Indeed, believers themselves can deny God not by doubting his presence but by how they live their lives, willfully rejecting his authority, and living as if he does not exist, and therefore is of no consequence, they effectively deny God through inaction. Therefore, while these ‘practical atheists’ may behave like atheists, they should not be confused as actually being atheists, and neither can they be classified as agnostics as they do not question God’s existence, but simply deny him through their behavior.

An atheist, on the other hand, is concerned specifically with denying the existence of God, and not only that, but they take it one step further, in that atheists believe that the existence of God is most likely false, or at the very least a speculative hypothesis with a low order of probability. So, while we have come a long way in our understanding, this is also not an adequate definition of the term. In other words, we need more nuance, because the previous definition has become too narrow, and no longer describes all forms of atheism. For some atheists, the very concept of ‘God’ as it’s used in religions like Judaism, Christianity, or Islam is not only false, but it’s completely incoherent, and therefore any associated claims are meaningless, and thus cannot even be described as ‘true’ or ‘false’. Therefore, when a believer thinks that their religious beliefs are true, some atheists think they are false, while agnostics are not sure, but this definition is still not adequate for describing all atheists. In other words, they will agree that religious claims are either true or false but, unlike both believers and atheists, agnostics claim that it is simply not possible to know which is true. The problem is that some atheists argue that many of these claims are not true, and neither are they false, but they are in fact fundamentally unintelligible, and it’s only through a kind of illusion that they appear to carry any meaning, and so we must push the definition further to accommodate all these various views. Therefore, this particular definition of atheism that questions intelligibility has not been agreed on by pragmatists and logical empiricists, and so the argument continues. And so we can see that our search for an adequate characterization of atheism has led to more questions, and shown us that not only is the current definition too narrow, but also too broad.

When thinking about belief in God, for example, fideistic believers are fully aware that when judged objectively, the likelihood of God’s existence is rather small. However, they believe in God not based on probability, but on necessity, they believe that without God the world does not make sense, they seek meaning for the chaos of the universe. It is on this point that our previous definitions have failed, because it does not sufficiently describe the difference between these types of believers, agnostics, and atheists. After all, all three might agree that these religious claims are highly speculative and improbable, so how do we differentiate between them? If a definition is not able to distinguish believers, nonbelievers, and agnostics, then the definition is not adequate, and so we have to dig deeper and continue our discussion.

Perhaps the issue is that we are getting too caught up in semantics. After all, there are no logical ways to prove or disprove God’s existence using only a priori, ontological arguments, focusing only on definitions of the concepts. Therefore it may not make sense to simply rule out the possibility of ‘God’ from the start. In other words, the ‘reasonable’ atheist takes as his stance the idea that there is no evidence of God, and thus he is justified in asserting that there is no God, and this seems very reasonable. However, we can then argue that it’s dogmatic to claim that no proof will ever justify belief in God, and so there is pushback against this type of atheist argument. Therefore, atheists should attempt to justify their stance by showing that no proof can warrant a belief in God. However, it’s important to state that the atheists justification relies on showing that there isn’t sufficient evidence to suggest a belief in God, rather than having to prove that no evidence is even possible. After all, imagine an atheist were to survive death, and stand in the presence of God. Their reasonable response, given the lack of evidence in life, would be that insufficient evidence had been provided during their previous life. It’s not that the atheist is justified in judging that God did not exist, but rather he is justified in being unable to believe in it. It is not, after all, that he was wrong in his denial, it’s rather that his position was justifiable based on the lack of proof. Indeed, given the absence of any proof of any kind, he should conclude that God does not exist, as his position is the reasonable one, in that context, even if that conclusion is found to be wrong in some hypothetical post-mortem existence. Moreover, one does not need to be completely certain to state that something is wrong, and so a reasonable atheist should be able to take on this tentative posture. Therefore, this more cautious atheism is indeed a reasonable position to take, and so perhaps we have found our proper definition of the term.

However, such an atheist, by using the absence of proof as his main argument is, in fact, using a burden-of-proof argument. Because, after all, if God exists as a transcendental being, then the burden of proof would rightly fall on the believer, not the atheist. Indeed, it is the believer who has the onus of producing the evidence that such a strange reality exists. And if God exists as the theist says, then it’s up to the theist to demonstrate that the world is more than what is commonly experienced. The atheist, on the other hand, uses the empirical method as the standard for judging reality. As such, the atheist will reject all claims that are not based on empirical fact and therefore has no reason to accept the claim of ‘spiritual’ or ‘transcendent’ facts. However, there is another type of atheism, in that it does not claim an outright rejection, but takes a more open and nuanced approach to the idea, remaining open-minded to the possibility of transcendent facts or metaphysical realities. These fallibilistic atheists recognize that even though they remain skeptical, there is the possibility that there is a reality that goes beyond what we currently know. This form of atheism is not agnosticism, as they do not simply suspend their beliefs, but hold onto their position that current facts are sufficient for them to deny the existence of God, however they remain open to that claim changing if new evidence is provided. Therefore, this atheist knows that things could be otherwise, that evidence could exist that could lead him to believing in God, or at the very least stop him from denying his existence, but until that happens he holds that God does not exist. They do not have reason to believe in God, through the application of empirical methods. Therefore, the atheistical conclusion is based on this understanding of the burden of proof, and so he concludes that, from the evidence available, God does not exist. They do not dogmatically reject the idea out of hand, but rather simply lack the necessary empirical proof. Thus, they remain thorough and consistent with a fallibilistic view, knowing that they can be wrong in their conclusions, and this brings us to the next stage.

While this new definition of atheism is an improvement on previous ones, it is still not adequate for all forms of atheism, but remains a good definition for pragmatic and naturalistic humanists. After all, the God that some of us refer to is not the anthropomorphic God of old, like Zeus or Odin, but a more abstract entity. Indeed, this God cannot be observed, or encountered, or detected, in the universe, because he is a transcendent and pure spirit, distinct from the universe he created. Thus, this ultimate mystery cannot be known in the same way we understand things in the world, so we cannot just point at God and have an understanding of its meaning. The meaning of ‘God’ must be understood intralinguistically, by describing the qualities of ‘God’ rather than showing it. Terms such as ‘maker of the universe’, or ‘eternal, independent being’ are used to define ‘God’, without understanding what these descriptions mean, then one cannot understand ‘God’. And the key terms that are used to describe ‘God’ are also non ostensive, in that they are not concepts that can be ‘shown’, and are used to describe a non-anthropomorphic God. Unlike something like Zeus, where we can know what it would mean to point to him or to see him, God, in its modern conception cannot be shown or observed in any way, and must therefore be understood as a mystery, a term that is neither empirical nor material. Indeed, any non-mysterious God would not be the God of Judaism, Christianity, or Islam, who is a mystery beyond human comprehension. Therefore, we cannot treat the existence of God as a scientific hypothesis that can be proven or disproven. It’s a mistake, these fallibilistic atheists argue, to treat ‘God’ as something that can be tested empirically, because this God isn’t meant to be that kind of entity. After all, if the God of Judeo-Christianity could be verified empirically, then it would not be the God of that religion, because the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition is transcendent and cannot be seen or touched in any way, therefore, any such encounter would not be God, or at least not the kind of God that is described in the religious texts.

At the heart of religions like Christianity is the idea that reality transcends the empirical, that there is a metaphysical reality, not simply a material one. This metaphysical belief states that the universe is dependent on an eternal, ever-present creative force. The issue, therefore, is how can we know this metaphysical world exists, or even understand what is being said? Scientific objects like protons and neutrinos are real components of the universe, not just useful concepts, but they are not transcendent to the universe; they are part of the same continuum, the only difference between them and other things is that they cannot be seen with the naked eye. And in the same way it’s difficult to understand what it would be like to see a proton or a neutrino, it’s similarly difficult for us to understand what it would be like to see God. However, science, through theoretical explanation, makes provisions for this, by opening the way to a possibility of seeing them in the future, whereas religion has a logical ban on ever being able to see God. After all, these scientific entities, while invisible, are understood as being a part of the universe, and therefore are the causes of what we do see. Therefore, it is logically possible to indirectly verify the existence of these entities through empirical methods, but that is not the case with the concept of God. Because we cannot establish a causal link between God and the universe, and therefore it’s not possible to verify God through science. Moreover, God does not fit into the category of things that can be explained by science, nor does the universe fit into that category, as it is not a discrete entity that can be compared to anything else. Therefore, the probability of God’s existence cannot be proven through empirical methods.

However, there are others who claim to have a non-empirical method of establishing the probability of God, these are the Gnostics. They claim that there are truths about the nature of the cosmos that do not require verification, and they claim to have knowledge that goes beyond mere empiricism. However, since Hume and Kant, the skepticism about the possibility of such knowledge has grown, in that both provided powerful critiques against the traditional proofs of God. These critiques have been so strong that there is now a general consensus between philosophers and theologians that no proof of God is possible. Appealing to intuitive knowledge or some sort of intuitive grasp of being is far too vague to be useful for establishing any proof. Moreover, before the study of anthropology, appeals to revelation and authority might have carried weight. However, now that we have knowledge of other religions we know that such claims of revealed truth are not valid proof. Revelations are too diverse, conflicting, and it’s not possible to prove any one is superior to the rest, and the same critique applies to religious authorities. It’s also not clear if genuine faith can really test the truth of any given revelation or religious authority, and if it were genuine, then trying to understand it with reason would be absurd. Given the diversity of conflicting revelations, how can one be said to be the “genuine article?”, and how can anyone decide this for themselves? In other words, if we were to test it, then that act of testing would be something that we did as a human, and therefore the truth would not come from the divine. Therefore, we can see that if there is a test for revelation and authority, then it is not revelation or authority that establishes religious truth but something else, something that guarantees that those religious truths are correct and that God truly exists. The question remains, what is that fundamental guarantee? It seems it’s nothing more than a cultural myth, as neither an empirical nor an a priori way of knowing God is possible, and even intuitive knowledge is not logically valid. Given all of these considerations it’s hard to see what a God-seeker would even be looking for, and what would count as evidence in such a situation, and it is not even clear what it would be like to have or not have proof. After all, even if you do not provide the proof yourself, you need at least to have an idea of what such a thing would look like, and it appears that this is not possible. Perhaps the seeker needs to only point out that the possibility of a proof is not a logical impossibility, in order to have some sort of way forward. However, for that you would need to understand what that proof would look like, and given the transcendent nature of God, that is also impossible. It seems then, there is a logical ban on there ever being a possibility of empirical evidence for God, however, while plausible, that claim should remain tentative. After all, let’s think through a hypothetical example to put our ideas to the test, keeping in mind that it is, of course, a hypothetical and not a representation of reality.

Imagine that one day thousands of people looked at the starry skies and, suddenly, the stars rearranged themselves to spell the word “God”, they would, of course, be astonished and maybe think they were going mad, or at the very least that they were suffering from a mass hallucination. Now even if it was shown that this was not a hallucination, it still would not constitute real evidence for the existence of God, because no matter how amazing that event would be, it would not explain the meaning of the term ‘God’. After all, it would not show that there was an infinite individual that is utterly incomprehensible, because all it would reveal is that something very strange had happened, not what anyone means by referring to God. Therefore, it’s questionable if anyone can provide a valid or intelligible account of the concept of God, once it has been de-anthropomorphized. And so, we arrive at the end of our journey, and we are left to ask, what constitutes an adequate definition for atheism? And what can we understand of agnosticism and religious responses to these questions?

For our purposes, we will define atheism as the belief that claims about the divine are either false or most likely false, but more adequately, it is the reasoned rejection of belief in God based on the incoherence of such a concept. In other words, for non-anthropomorphic conceptions of God, atheists reject that idea, because it’s considered to be meaningless, contradictory, and ultimately unintelligible. Similarly, if modern theologians present their concept of God as something symbolic or metaphorical, atheists see this as a mask of atheistic concepts, and reject that idea too. Therefore, atheism is a complex notion that includes a variety of reflective rejections, and is most importantly based on the idea that the concept of God does not make sense, is incoherent and therefore unintelligible. This broader conception of atheism includes narrower senses of the term, but not vice versa, and does not make the claim that all religious claims are always meaningless, but rather that core elements, such as the ‘infinite and eternal creator’ are fundamentally incoherent, and therefore not a rational object of belief. This is a central part of contemporary atheism. Therefore, there are empirical reasons to reject anthropomorphic Gods, but also, a rejection of a non-anthropomorphic God, when considered to be incoherent, is the strongest form of rejection possible. Atheism is therefore not simply about rejecting claims as false, but rather rejecting them as lacking a coherent truth claim. They see religious claims as something that does not make sense and that believers are under the illusion that they do, and these cosmological claims are, ultimately, best understood as confused myths or ideologies.

However, some Protestant theologians who wish to defend their belief have tried to say that the problem for them is not a literal belief in God, but rather that it must be understood metaphorically, but this does not answer the critique. After all, Christian theologians like Reinhold Niebuhr claim that their religion is a ‘true myth’, and these are, in effect, attempts to see religious claims as metaphors, that cannot be understood in any other terms. However, if a term is a metaphor, then it should be possible to say what it is a metaphor for, and metaphors must ultimately be able to be translated into non-metaphorical terms. In other words, if there is no possibility of paraphrase, then we are not talking about metaphors, but symbols. In effect, the language of religion becomes the language of myth, but then it must be a myth with atheistic substance. Therefore, the believer who takes this route, makes the same claim as the atheist, but adds an emotive component to their beliefs.

Agnosticism, in its contemporary form, has seen a parallel development to atheism, but there are important differences. Like the atheist, the agnostic does not know, or believe that it can be known, if God exists, but unlike atheists, they do not assert that God does not exist or cannot exist. Similar to contemporary atheists, many agnostics believe that the concept of God as it appears in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, is radically problematic, however, they remain uncertain as to if these are problems of incoherence, or if it is just a paradox. After all, they might say that they are simply not in a position to be able to decide if such beliefs do not make sense, or if the talk about an ‘ultimate mystery’ simply remains beyond the bounds of rational thought, but still coherent. For them, the problem about God is more than just the lack of empirical proof, because they know that any discussion about God would require a non-anthropomorphic understanding, and therefore a description that is not just based on the language we use. This does not commit them to any form of observation of reality that is independent from theory. Therefore, believers think that the meaning of ‘God’ is secured even though it remains a mystery, but atheists think that any such meaning cannot be secured. Atheists consider any talk about mystery as a form of intellectual evasion. However, contemporary agnostics, like their atheistic counterparts, remain in doubt if such a reference to God can be secured, and remain uncertain if the concept is anything more than the term itself, and if there is something that is being referred to by ‘God’ that is religiously acceptable.

And so we can see that all of the sides are, in their own way, aware that such religious claims are paradoxical, but they disagree on how they view that paradox. After all, the criteria for determining if something is meaningless or unintelligible is itself highly debated, and there are no generally accepted criteria. Therefore, given these diverse considerations, the central question remains: is there a good reason to believe in a creative, personal reality that is beyond the bounds of space, time, and transcendent to this world? Is it possible to have sufficient understanding of such talk of reality to allow it to be a basis for faith? After all, faith needs some degree of understanding, as you cannot simply decide to have faith in something you do not understand. Therefore, you need to at least have some idea of what you are trusting in order to trust it. For example, you could not just take some arbitrary thing on trust, you need a concept of that thing first. We can all agree that the universe is a brute fact and it is a source of wonder, awe, and puzzlement, but there is no need to make the additional assumption of a non-contingent reality for such a world to exist, nor do we even understand what a non-contingent being would even look like. Indeed, for some atheists the problem is so immense that any attempt to refer to God is doomed to failure, and therefore they cannot reasonably believe in it. However, believers, while recognizing the immense problem of this concept, still think that such a concept has meaning, and that it is not completely irrational or incoherent. Therefore, they may conclude that while these problems exist, they do not make the concept incapable of a religious interpretation. Agnostics, on the other hand, see that there is no rational way to decide this truth, because they have no way of knowing if the concept of ‘God’ even has a religiously adequate reference.

And so, we must ask the crucial question: is the concept of ‘contingent thing’ a redundant phrase? Is ‘infinite reality’ a meaningless statement? Is a non-anthropomorphic concept of ‘God’ understandable enough to make any faith in it possible? And while it might be said, as is sometimes done, that even if religious belief is an intellectual absurdity, it is still necessary for morality and meaning in life, that is not a valid claim, because life, even without God, can have purpose. The argument that without God life has no purpose is false, we have no reason to believe that there are no purposes or goals for our lives in a godless world. We can have things that are valuable to us, regardless of God. Whether there is a God or not, it’s wrong to torture others, and friendship, solidarity, love, and self-respect remain human goods, even in a godless world. While we may have problems understanding moral values in general, those intellectual puzzles are present both in secular and religious ethics, and so one is not better or worse than the other in that regard. Therefore, these things remain desirable and we can find life worth living and meaningful even in the absence of God.